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Inherent Sanctioning Power in the Federal 
Courts After Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. . 
Litigants in federal court are seeing an increased emphasis 
on sanctions to curb litigation misconduct. Various Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended to include sanc- 
tions,' and an important federal sanctioning statute has been 
amended to give it more "teeth.'a The Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules has advocated increased use of sanctions to control 
litigation abuse,3 as have other judges and  scholar^.^ In re- 
sponse, federal courts have interpreted sanctioning provisions 
broadly to help effectuate their stated  purpose^.^ 
Yet the most potent sanctioning power might not be em- 
bodied in any set of rules or statutes, but rather embedded in 
the institution of the judiciary itself: the inherent power of a 
federal court to shift attorney's fees as sanctions for bad-faith 
litigation. In Chambers v. NASCO, I ~ c . , ~  a divided Supreme 
Court upheld the use of this power to sanction a party for near- 
1. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983 amendment) (sanctions for filing groundless 
paper); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(0 (1983 amendment) (sanctions for violating pretrial 
order); FED. R. CN. P. 26(g) (1983 amendment) (sanctions for violating good-faith 
discovery procedures). 
2. 28 U.S.C. $ 1927 (1988) (1980 amendment) (allowing recovery of excess 
attorney's fees and expenses against opposing counsel who have "multiplie[d] the 
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously"). 
3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendment 
("The new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of the courts to impose 
sanctions . . . ."); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) advisory committee's note to the 1983 
amendment ("Because of the asserted reluctance to impose sanctions on attorneys 
who abuse the discovery rules, Rule 26(g) makes explic% the authority judges now 
have to impose appropriate sanctions and requires them to use it." (citations omit- 
ted)). 
4. See, e.g., William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 
1 I-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, ' 181-84 (1985). 
5.  See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 
639, 643 (1976) (encouraging liberal application of discovery sanctions); Zaldivar v. 
City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 n.5 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting "recent general 
effort" by courts and Congress to encourage use of sanctions); cf. FEDERAL PROC. 
COMM., A.B.A., SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS 3 (1st ed. 1986) [herein- 
after SANCTIONS] (noting increased frequency of sanctions). 
6. 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991). 
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ly one million dollars, holding that express sanctioning provi- 
sions do not limit use of the inherent sanctioning power. 
This Note examines the ramifications of Chambers on sanc- 
tions jurisprudence and on the other inherent powers of federal 
courts. Part I1 provides the background for the case, exploring 
the evolution and interplay of the inherent and textual powers 
a t  issue. Part I11 summarizes the case and the competing opin- 
ions. Part lV examines the impact of the holding, analyzing the 
inherent sanctioning power that emerged from Chambers and 
critiquing the Court's methodology. Part V concludes that 
Chambers forged a new inherent power for the federal courts to 
use in the war against litigation misconduct, but that i t  did so 
a t  the expense of clarity and faithfulness to precedent. 
A. General Recognition of Inherent Powers 
Article I11 of the Constitution provides that "[tlhe judicial 
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish."? Inherent in the concept of 
judicial power are 
[clertain implied powers [that] must necessarily result to our 
Courts of justice from the nature of their institution. . . . To 
fine for contempt--imprison for contumacy-inforce the ob- 
servance of order, &c. are powers which cannot be dispensed 
with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of 
all others: and so far our Courts no doubt possess powers not 
immediately derived from statute . . . .' 
These implied or "inherent" powers are generally institutional 
powers of control that allow a court to maintain the integrity of 
its  proceeding^.^ Included in these powers are those originally 
possessed by the English equity courts and vested in federal 
district courts upon their creation, subject to modifications by 
Congress.1° 
7.  U.S. CONST. art. 111, 5 1. 
8. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). 
9. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1947) (power to 
dismiss a case for inconvenient forum); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 
(1824) (power to discipline attorneys); Anderson v. DUM, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 
227 (1821) (power to impose silence and respect in court's presence). 
10. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65 (1939). 
CHAMBERS V. NASCO, INC. 
B. Assertion of Inherent Power to Allow 
Attorney's ~ e e s  as Costs 
One of the powers purportedly possessed by the English 
courts and, consequently, inherent in every federal district 
court, is the power to impose attorney's fees as costs if a losing 
party litigates in bad faith." Ordinarily, a losing party in fed- 
eral court must pay the prevailing party's costs.12 "Costs" com- 
prise the expenses of litigation,13 such as court fees, court re- 
porter fees, and copies,14 but generally do not include 
attorney's fees.15 
Congress controls the costs available to prevailing par- 
tied6 and has specified by statute instances in which 
attorney's fees may be included as costs." The federal judi- 
ciary, however, has asserted an inherent power to tax 
attorney's fees as costs in several additional instances, includ- 
ing litigation in which a losing party "has acted in bad faith, 
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive  reason^."'^ Because of 
its penal nature, exercise of this inherent power to  shift fees 
has sometimes been viewed as a sanction.lg 
11. See Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees for Abuses of the Judicial Sys- 
tem, 61  N.C. L. REV. 613, 631-32 11.123 (1983); Joan Chipser, Note, Attorney's Fees 
and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HAS~INGS L.J. 319, 324 (1977). 
12. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(d) ("Except when express provision therefor is made ei- 
ther in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as 
of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs . . . .*). 
13. See Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 849 (1929). 
14. See 28 U.S.C. fj 1920 (1988) (listing items that may be taxed as costs). 
15. See 10 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
$ 2675 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1992); C. Dallas Sands, Attorneys' Fees as  Recoverable 
Costs, 63 A.B.A. J. 510, 510 (1977) ("The American rule . . . generally withholds 
from successhl litigants the right to recover attorneys' fees from the losers as an 
item of costs . . . .*). The American Rule dif'fers from the traditional English Rule 
that regularly includes attorney's fees as costs. See Goodhart, supra note 13, a t  
856 (costs in the English courts may include "necessary" attorney's fees). 
16. See Alyeska Pipeline Sew. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 251-57 
(1975). 
17. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1923 (1988) (attorney's docket fees recoverable as costs). 
Congress has also allowed recovery of attorney's fees under various statutes grant- 
ing or protecting certain federal rights. See Alyeskxc, 421 U.S. at 260 & n.33 (list- 
ing examples). 
18. F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 
129 (1974). 
19. See generally SANCTIONS, supra note 5 (surveying sanctions in each of the 
federal circuits, including sanctions imposed under courts' "inherent power*). 
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C. Sanctions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure began gov- 
erning procedure in the federal courts.20 In recent years,'the 
Rules have been amended to allow, and in some cases mandate, 
sanctions for certain procedural abuses.21 Furthermore, the 
Rules now allow fee shifting as a sanctioning option.22 Per- 
haps the most notable of these provisions is Rule 11, which 
mandates sanctions for signing a pleading, motion, or other 
paper that is frivolous or imposed for an improper purpose.23 
Various statutory enactments also include fee shifting mecha- 
n i s m ~ . ~ ~  
D. Interplay Between Inherent Powers and 
Textual Sanctioning Powers 
Several important cases dealing with the interplay be- 
tween inherent powers and statutory or rule-based sanctioning 
powers set the stage for the Chambers dispute. In Societe 
Internationale v. Rogers,25 the Supreme Court considered the 
authority of a district court to dismiss a complaint for failure to 
comply with a discovery order. The Court held that  Rule 37 
specifically addressed the situation a t  hand26 and rejected the 
lower court's consideration of Rule 41 or inherent  power^.^' 
Consideration of these other sources, the Court explained, 
20. generally PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., ,HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL 
CO~JRTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 759-61 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing the Rules En- 
abling Act, the subsequent promulgation of the Federal Rules, and the combining 
of law and equity). The Rules united the procedures for cases in equity with those 
a t  law. FED. R. CW. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in the United States 
district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or 
in equity . . . ."). 
21. See rules cited supra note 1. 
22. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f) (for violating pre-trial order); FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(g) (for violating good-faith discovery procedures); FED. R. CN. P. 37 (for failing 
to cooperate in discovery). 
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (including a reasonable attorney's fee in the amount that 
may be awarded as sanctions). 
24. E.g., 28 U.S.C. $ 1927 (1988) (allowing sanctions against attorneys who 
multiply litigation unreasonably and vexatiously); see also supm note 17 and ac- 
companying text. 
25. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). 
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 3703) (authorizing sanctions for failure to comply with dis- 
covery orders). 
27. The Court held that Rule 41  governed only dismissals a t  trial. 357 U.S. a t  
207. 
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would "only obscure analysis of the problem."28 
Four years later, however, Link v. Wabash Railroad CO.~' 
upheld a district court's inherent power to dismiss a suit on its 
own motion, despite the existence of Rule 41 governing dismiss- 
a l ~ . ~ ~  The Court held that the power to dismiss for lack of 
prosecution had long been recognized as inherent in federal 
courts and that Rule 41 alone was insufficient evidence of con- 
gressional intent to abrogate this inherent power.31 
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society:' the 
Court considered a request for attorney's fees by a prevailing 
party who had brought suit to vindicate important statutory 
rights affecting all citizens. The Court declined to fashion a 
new exception to the American Rule,s3 putting a stop to inno- 
vative judicial fee shifting without congressional approval. 
However, the Court noted three narrow exceptions from the 
cases which could justify fee shifting in certain circumstances: 
litigation to preserve a common fund, willful disobedience of a 
court order, and bad faith? 
Finally, in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,s5 the Court 
upheld fee shifting against an attorney for "uncooperative be- 
h a ~ i o r " ~ ~  based on a federal sanctioning s ta t~ te .~ '  The Court 
remanded the case for additional consideration of sanctions 
based on Rule 37 and the district court's inherent powers.38 
111. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. 
A. History 
Chambers entered into a contract with NASCO, Inc. to sell 
his TV station, but subsequently refused to perform. When 
28. Id. 
29. 370 U.S. 626 (1962). 
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 4103) ("For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply 
with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may moue for dismissal of an 
action or of any claim against him." (emphasis added)). 
31. 370 U.S. at 630-32. The Court distinguished Societe Internationale on its 
facts. Id. at 636. 
32. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
33. See supra note 15. 
34. 421 U.S. at 257-59 (dicta). 
35. 447 U.S. 752 (1980). 
36. Id. at 754. 
37. 28 U.S.C. 8 1927 (1976) (allowing sanctions against counsel who "unreason- 
ably and vexatiously" multiply litigation, but not including attorney's fees) (amend- 
ed 1980). 
38. See 447 U.S. at 767-68. 
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NASCO prepared to file suit in federal district court, Chambers 
and his attorneys began a series of tactics to harass and delay 
NASCO, to deprive the court of jurisdiction, and to frustrate 
specific per forman~e .~~ Despite repeated warnings, contempt 
sanctions, and injunctions by the court, the tactics continued 
over several yearsO4O Shortly before trial on the merits, Cham- 
bers stipulated that the contract was enforceable and that he 
had brea~hed.~'  The trial court subsequently granted NASCO 
specific p e r f ~ r m a n c e . ~ ~  The Fifth Circuit dismissed 
Chambers's subsequent appeal as frivolous, imposed appellate 
sanctions, and remanded with instructions to the trial court to 
consider further sanctions.43 On remand, the district court con- 
sidered sanctions under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the 
court's "inherent powers."" The court determined that Rule 
11 was "insufficient for [its] purposes" and that § 1927 applied 
only to attorneys.45 Reasoning that "[c]ourts possess the inher- 
ent power to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation 
pra~tices,'"~ the court assessed all of NASCO's attorneys' fees 
against Chambers personally-$996,644.65.47 The Fifth Cir- 
cuit affirmed.48 
B. The Holding 
In  the Supreme Court, Chambers argued that a court must 
exhaust the express sanctioning provisions of the federal rules 
and statutes before it can resort to inherent fee shifting pow- 
39. See NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 127 
(W.D. La. 1989). 
40. The conduct included fraudulently conveying the TV station to preclude spe- 
cific performance; withholding information from the court; violating temporary re- 
straining orders and injunctions; blocking discovery attempts; filing baseless mo- 
tions, charges, and counterclaims; taking needless depositions; repeatedly seeking 
continuances and extensions to delay the proceedings; filing to recuse the trial 
judge; removing the TV station's equipment from service before going through with 
the sale; and engaging in other similar actions. See id. at  125-30 (detailing the 
sandionable conduct). 
41. Id. at  128. 
42. NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. 
La. 1985). 
43. See 124 F.R.D. at  137. 
44. Id. at  138. 
45. Id. at 138-39. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 143. The court also invoked its inherent power to disbar one attorney 
and suspend two others. See id. at  144-46. 
48. NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 
1990). 
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ers? Justice White, writing for the majority, rejected this ar- 
gument, holding that the textual sanctioning scheme does not 
displace inherent powers.50 The Court recognized the sanction 
in this case as a proper exercise of the Alyeska inherent power 
to shift fees for bad-faith litigation:' and cited Link and 
Roadway Express for the proposition that this inherent power 
coexists with textual provisions absent contrary congressional 
intent.52 The Court found no such intent in the amendments 
to  Rule 11 or to 5 1927, amendments enacted after Roadway 
Express was decided.53 The Court also rejected analogy to 
Societe Internationale because the Rule in that case specifically 
addressed all the conduct at issue.54 
Justice White noted that a court should ordinarily rely on 
the Rules, but that it may rely on inherent power to impose 
sanctions if the Rules are inadeq~ate .~~  He reasoned that the 
express provisions are supplements to, not substitutes for, 
inherent power.56 In circumstances in which all of a litigant's 
conduct is deemed sanctionable, as here, a Rule-by-Rule ap- 
proach would merely foster satellite litigation and thus further 
derail the normal functioning of the courts.57 
C. The Dissenters 
Justice Kennedy dissented, maintaining that the district 
court erred in using its inherent sanctioning power "without 
prior recourse to controlling rules and statutes."5s He listed 
numerous express sanctions that could have been used to 
49. See Brief of Petitioner on the Merits at  9, Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 
S. Ct. 2123 (1991) (NO. 90-256). 
50. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at  2134. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and 
O'Connor joined the majority opinion. Justice K e ~ e d y  dissented, joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Souter. Id. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice 
Scalia wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 2140 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
51; See id. at  2133; see also supra text accompanying notes 32-34. 
52. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at  2135; see also supra text accompanying notes 29-31 
& 35-38. 
53. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134. 
54. See id. at 2135 n.14; see also supra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
55. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at  2136. 
56. Id. at 2134. 
57. Id. at  2136. The Court also rejected the suggestion that reliance on inher- 
ent powers by a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction in a state that does 
not recognize the bad-faith exception violates the Erie doctrine. Id. a t  2136-37. The 
Court reasoned that Erie governs only substantive conflicts not at  issue here. Id. 
at  2 137. 
58. Id. at  2141 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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achieve a similar result and reasoned that Congress, not the 
courts, has the power to reallocate litigation  expense^.^' Ab- 
sent an express provision to the contrary, the American Rule 
controls. Allowing courts to  resort to their inherent powers 
when not absolutely necessary will discourage use of the Rules 
and encourage findings of bad faith." Using the inherent pow- 
er in this manner, he argued, threatens uniformity in the 
courts, may cause due process problems, and could chill vigor- 
ous advocacy.61 He allowed for the existence of inherent pow- 
er, but maintained that the Rules limit its use? 
IV. ANALYSIS 
"[Tlhe notion of inherent power has been described as 
nebulous, and its bounds as 'shadowy.'"63 The source of the 
power has been q~est ioned,~~ and its use frequently criti- 
~ i z e d ? ~  Nevertheless, courts in every circuit have used the 
power t o  impose  sanction^.^^ Courts and commentators agree 
it is potent; some argue it may be nearly "bo~ndless."~~ "No 
court, however, has adequately defined the inherent power."68 
Chambers is the latest in a sparse series of Supreme Court 
decisionssg that attempt to grapple with the inherent power 
59. Id. at  2141-42. 
60. Id. at  2143. 
61. Id. at  2145. 
62. See id. at 2142-43. Justice Kennedy also objected that some of the sanctions 
in this case penalized prelitigation conduct in violation of the Erie doctrine. See id. 
a t  2141. Justice Scalia agreed, objecting further that Chambers was sanctioned for 
conduct that took place beyond the confines of the court. See id. (Scalia, J., dis- 
senting). 
63. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (footnote 
omitted). 
64. Inherent power has been generally defined as "authority possessed without 
its being derived from another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONAM 782 (6th ed. 1990). Some 
scholars, however, have pointed to a 14th century English statute as the basis of 
the sanctioning power. See Goodhart, supra note 13, at 854. "The better view 
seems to be that the power was inherent, and it is clear that the courts have 
acted on this view." Id. 
65. See, e.g., Neil H .  Cogan, The Inherent Power and Due Process Modejs in 
Conflict: Sanctions in the Fifth Circuit, 42 SW. L.J. 1011 (1989); Adam Behar, 
Note, The Misuse of Inherent Powers when Imposing ASanctions for Discovery Abuse: 
The Exclusivity of Rule 37, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1779, 1786-87 (1988); Joseph J .  
Janatka, Note, Tlw Inherent Power: An Obscure Doctrine Confronts Due Process, 65 
WASH. U. L.Q. 429 (1987). 
66. See Behar, supra note 65, at 1791. 
67. Cogan, supra note 65, at  1013. 
68. Janatka, supra note 65, a t  443. 
69. See supra part 1I.D. 
12091 CHAMBERS V. NASCO, INC. 1217 
concept in this context. Analysis of the decision leads to two 
conclusions. First, the Chambers Court did more than reaffirm 
existing powers-it created a new sanctioning power.70 Sec- 
ond, the Court used inherent powers precedents indiscriminate- 
ly, thereby further obscuring the scope and limitations of the 
new p ~ w e r . ~ '  
A. Transformation of the Equity Power into 
a Roving Sanctioning Power 
The Supreme Court arguably decided correctly the question 
it presented itself in Chambers: whether various textual sanc- 
tioning provisions refled a legislative intent to displace the 
inherent power of a federal court to shift fees for bad-faith 
l i t igati~n.?~ Without exception, commentaries on textual fee 
shifting provisions illustrate that those provisions were not 
designed to displace inherent equity powers.73 But the Court's 
decision altered the assumptions upon which the stated ques- 
tion was based. The Court's dicta transformed the historic 
equity power to shift fees for bad-faith litigation into a roving 
sanctioning power. A look at the cases demonstrates that 
Chambers takes an extremely revisionist view of the federal 
judiciary's traditional powers. 
Before Chambers, the bad-faith exception to the American 
Rule had certain characteristics: (1) it was an exception to the 
manner in which costs were calculated, (2) it  was available 
only against a losing party, and (3) it  was generally used to 
redress bad-faith conduct. After Chambers, a new sanctioning 
power emerged, with a very chfferent set of characteristics. The 
new inherent power: (1) is as readily available as  any of the 
70. See infra part W.A. 
71. See infra part W.B. 
72. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2131-32 (1991). 
73. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendment 
(Amended Rule 11 %uild[s] upon and expand[s] the equitable doctrine permitting 
the court to award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose opponent 
acts in bad faith."); Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 206 ('While adopting a formidable 
array of statutes authorizing awards of attorney's fees to prevailing parties, Con- 
gress has not repudiated the judicially created bad-faith exception . . . ."); cf. FED. 
R. Crv. P. 26(g) advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendment ("Rule 26(g) 
makes explicit the authority judges now have to impose appropriate sanctions and 
requires them to use it."); SANCTIONS, supra note 5, a t  14 ("[Flederal courts have 
always had inherent power to impose sanctions apart from any rule or statute. 
Indeed, the recent amendment to Rule 11 is not the source of sanctions power, but 
rather confirmation that it must be used." (citation omitted)). 
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Rules, regardless of whether costs are involved; (2) may be 
used against either party, regardless of the merits of the case; 
and (3) may be used to  impose sanctions for discrete conduct 
within the course of litigation, even when a suit is initiated or 
otherwise conducted in good faith. 
1. Alyeska to Chambers: Where did the costs go? 
When Alyeska was decided in 1975, the opinion included 
an exhaustive discussion of judicially awarded costs, contrast- 
ing the English approach with the historical approach in this 
country and exploring the inclusion of attorney's fees as 
costs.?* The Alyeska Court thus made clear that an award of 
fees against a bad-faith litigant was merely an exception to the 
general rule of systematic exclusion of fees in determining 
Chambers, in contrast, is notable for its lack of discussion 
about costs. The decision considers the inherent power to shift 
fees to be merely another form of sanctions. This conclusion is 
somewhat understandable: the district court approached the 
issue in this manner.76 It is not understandable, however, in 
light of the Court's own precedents. 
In both Alyeska and Roadway Express, the question of 
attorney's fees arose when the prevailing litigant presented its 
bill of costs to the district court, including in its costs the 
attorneys' time spent on the litigation.?? The district courts in 
those cases thus considered the request for attorney's fees in 
the proper context and with the appropriate frame of reference 
for addressing the issue. 
In Chambers, however, the question of attorney's fees arose 
when the district court considered sanctions against Chambers 
for his conduct in litigati~n.?~ The district court thus consid- 
ered the request for attorney's fees in a very different context 
than did Alyeska and Roadway Express. Although this ap- 
proach could have led to a resolution consistent with precedent, 
74. See Alyeska Pipeline Sew. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-57 
(1975). 
75. See id. at 257-59. 
76. See NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 138 
W.D. La. 1989). 
77. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 755 (1980); AZyesh, 421 
U S .  at 245 & n.14. 
78. See NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 138- 
39 (W.D. La. 1989). 
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it ultimately led only to conceptual problems. No longer was 
the issue the applicability of an equitable exception t o  the 
American Rule; at issue now was the scope of a court's inherent 
power to impose sanctions in the face of textual sanctioning 
provisions, quite a different question. 
Had the district court considered the attorney's fees in 
their proper context, as part of a cost determination, the only 
question would have been which Rule ~ontrolled.'~ This would 
have been a more manageable question and ultimately would 
have avoided much needless discussion of nebulous inherent 
powers. 
Instead, the question framed by the Court led to the forma- 
tion of a power independent of the cost determination, a power 
which stands side-by-side with the sanctions in the Federal 
Rules. Some of the problems that attend this new inherent 
sanctioning power can be seen immediately. First, the Rules 
and the case law interpreting the Rules control the imposition 
of textual sanctions. They dictate certain procedures, lay down 
a clear standard, and minimize due process problems.80 The 
new power, however, falls outside that body of law? Further- 
79. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958), could have been in- 
structive on this point. Societe Internationale considered the propriety of using two 
different Federal Rules to dismiss a case for failure to comply with a discovery or- 
der. The Court noted that Rule 41 falls under the "Trials" section of the Rules and 
held that only Rule 37 governed dismissal of actions in the discovery phase. Id. at  
207. The Court refused to consider inherent powers in making its determination. 
Id. 
In Chambers, a determination of costs would have been governed by Rule 54(d), 
making available the bad-faith exception without need for considering the provi- 
sions of other Rules or statutes. Because the district court here was not engaged 
in a cost determination, Societe Internationale would instruct that Rule 54 was 
inapplicable. Thus, consideration of issues associated with costs, such as the bad- 
faith exception, would not have been addressed. 
80. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2145 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) ("The Federal Rules establish explicit standards for, and explicit checks 
against, the exercise of judicial authority."). See generally SANCTIONS, supra note 5 
(surveying the vast body of Rule 11 case law). 
81. See Marcia Coyle, The High Court Gives Judges Greater Powers, NAT'L L.J., 
June 17, 1991, at  3, 31 ("The [Chambers] justices do not require notice or other 
limiting provisions contained in Rule 11 and elsewhere."); id. (remarks of NASCO 
counsel, Joel I. Klein) ("I don't think the court has set down a framework here. 
They're satisfied now to establish the power, and much like Rule 11, they will wait 
and see how it is played out."); Cornelia H. Tuite, Sanctions Standards Still 
Murky, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 84 ("Ironically, if conduct falls outside Rule 11, but 
is motivated by a similar species of bad faith as a Rule 11 breach, complete fee- 
shifting without consideration of [limiting case law factors] may be possible if the 
court relies on inherent sanctioning powers."); cf id. (in hearing Chambers's inter- 
mediate appeal, the 5th Circuit "did not discuss the factors a court should employ 
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more, because the Chambers power is in many respects incon- 
sistent with the fee shifting powers recognized in prior Su- 
preme Court cases, i t  arguably falls outside the strictures that 
apply when shifting fees as part of litigation costs. At a mini- 
mum, the applicability of the precedents is unclear. As it 
stands, the new power is a sanctions power that has been de- 
fined but which has no readily ascertainable boundaries. Thus, 
the new power runs squarely into the criticisms often leveled a t  
inherent powers in general.82 
The Chambers Court itself best sums up the transforma- 
tion, although oblivious that it is breaking new ground: "The 
imposition of sanctions in this instance transcends a court's 
equitable power concerning relations between the parties and 
reaches a court's inherent power to police itself."83 The rami- 
fications of this departure remain to be seen. 
2. The losing party requirement 
The Court's own precedents point out unequivocally that a 
bad-faith fee shift may only be assessed against a losing par- 
ty." This makes analytical sense, since costs are to be taxed 
when awarding fees under Alyeska"). 
82. See, eg., Janatka, supra note 65, at  439-40 (no precise procedural re- 
quirements for inherent powers); Behar, supra note 65, a t  1807 ("[Dlespite greatly 
increased sanctioning powers, a basic problem still remains inherent in the system: 
judges' confusion over which power to use, which sanction to impose, when to im- 
pose it, and by what standard sanctionable conduct is to be evaluated."); cf. Cogan, 
supra note 65, at 1015 (Allowing sanctions to be reviewed under an abuse of dis- 
cretion standard "give[s] no notice to the profession as to what the court[s] truly 
d e e d ]  to be sanctionable conduct."); id. at 1017-18 ("A district court that need not 
explain its decisions in detailed findings of facts and conclusions of law, and a 
district court that is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard only, is pow- 
erful indeed."). 
83. 111 S. Ct. at 2133. 
84. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) 
(Courts may assess attorney's fees "when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, 
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.' "); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U.S. 678, 689 (1978) (It is a "settled rule that a losing litigant's bad faith may 
justify an allowance of fees to the prevailing party."); F.D. Rich Co. v. United 
States ex rel. Industrial Labor Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974) ('We have long recog- 
nized that attorneys' fees may be awarded to a successful party when his opponent 
has acted in bad faith . . . .") Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) ("[Ilt is unques- 
tioned that a federal court may award counsel fees to a successful party when his 
opponent has acted 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive rea- 
sons.' "); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968) (YIIt has 
long been held that a federal court may award counsel fees to a successful plaintiff 
where a defense has been maintained 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons.' "). 
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to the losing party.85 Chambers builds upon that traditional 
equity power in forging its new power: "[Tlhe imposition of 
sanctions under the bad-faith exception depends not on which 
party wins the lawsuit, but on how the parties conduct them- 
selves during the litigati~n."~~ 
This development flies in the face of precedent. In Alyeska, 
the Court reeled in the lower courts' fee awards, identifying the 
boundaries of judicial discretion and emphasizing that "the 
circumstances under which attorneys' fees are to be awarded 
and the range of discretion of the courts in making those 
awards are matters for Congress to determine.'"? The Alyeska 
Court further recognized that "Congress has not . . . extended 
any roving authority to the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as 
costs or otherwise whenever the courts might deem them war- 
ranted."88 Chambers seems to grant that roving authori- 
ty-still without an act from Congress-and thus ignores the 
rule enunciated by the Alyeska Court. 
Although the Chambers Court makes its move without 
citing a~thority,'~ some authority can be found in the lower 
 court^.'^ The question then becomes whether the Court should 
affirm the practice of the lower courts or stand by its own pre- 
cedents. The Court decides to do both, approving of the powers 
developed in the lower courts while attempting to  square its 
decision with prior Supreme Court cases. Precedent bending is 
the inevitable result." 
3. The discrete conduct departure 
Generally, the bad-faith exception has been invoked to 
assess fees against a party when litigation is initiated or con- 
85. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d). 
86. 111 S. Ct. at 2137 (emphasis added). 
87. 421 U.S. at  262. 
88. Id. at  259 (emphasis added); cf. William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1020 (1988) ("[Flee shifting ought not to be undertaken 
without clear authority."). 
89. See 111 S. Ct. at  2137. 
90. Eg., Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 958 (4th Cir. 1975) ("[Elven a win- 
ner may have to  pay obstinacy fees . . . ."); see also Lipsig v. National Student 
Marketing Corp., 663 F.2d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Wright); cf. Batson v. 
Neal Spelce Assoc., 805 F.2d 546, 548 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Lipsig) (bad faith in 
conduct of litigation distinct from bad faith in filing and maintaining action), cited 
with approval in NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 
120, 139 (W.D. La. 1989). 
91. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's indiscriminate use of precedents in 
Chambers and other inherent powers cases, see infia part N.B. 
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ducted completely or substantially in bad faith.s2 Consequent- 
ly, the cases usually involved all or substantially all the 
attorney's fees.g3 
Chambers appears to be such a case, one "in which all of 
[the] litigant's conduct is deemed ~anctionable.'*~ The Cham- 
bers dicta, however, seem to modify this facet of the inherent 
power cases. After Chambers, a court might not be limited to 
shifting fees only when a party has engaged in a bad-faith 
course of conduct; it might also shift fees upon a finding of bad 
faith in discrete conduct within a normal suit.95 Under this 
approach, even a party engaged in good-faith litigation may 
have inherent power sanctions imposed if some of the conduct 
is undertaken in bad faith, raising again the specter of the 
roving sanctioning If the Court's dicta indeed justify 
this conclusion, the inherent sanctioning power runs squarely 
into the criticisms leveled by the Chambers  dissenter^.^' 
In sum, the power that emerges from the Chambers dicta 
is not the traditional inherent equity power. Clearly it is not 
the Alyeska-Roadway Express power. The Court reshapes its 
precedents to forge a new power that gives the federal courts 
roving authority to impose fee-shifting sanctions. 
B. Indiscriminate Use of Precedents 
The departures from precedent in Chambers are not so 
much new developments as they are a product of jumbled pre- 
92. See 6 JAMES W.MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 91 54.78[3], at 
54-507 (2d ed. 1992) ("In many of these cases the bad faith, vexation, or oppres- 
sion relates to the entire proceeding . . . ."). 
93. E.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 US. 752, 756 (1980); Alyeska 
Pipeline Sew. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 & 11.13 (1975). 
94. 111 S. Ct. at 2136. Chambers also involved the entire amount of attorney's 
fees. Id, at 2130. 
95. As the Court noted, 
There is, therefore, nothing in the other sanctioning mechanisms or 
prior cases interpreting them that warrants a conclusion that a federal 
court may not, as a matter of law, resort to its inherent power to impose 
attorney's fees as a sanction for bad-faith conduct. This is plainly the case 
where the conduct at  issue is not covered by one of the other sanctioning 
provisions. But neither is a federal court forbidden to sanction bad-faith 
conduct by means of the inherent power simply because that conduct 
could also be sanctioned under the statute or the rules. 
111 S. Ct. at 2135-36. 
96. See supra part IV.A.1. 
97. See supra part 1II.C (summarizing the dissents). See generally 111 S. Ct. at 
2141-47 ( K e ~ e d y ,  J., dissenting) (criticizing the inherent sanctioning power). 
CHAMBERS K NASCO, INC. 
cedents. This fact is troubling for three reasons. First, it calls 
into question the legitimacy of the power itself. Second, it calls 
into question the means the Court used to  devise that power. 
Third, it obscures the law in breach of the Supreme Court's 
duty to clarify the law. In short, "[wlhether a couk acts legiti- 
mately in seeking to  achieve just, speedy, and inexpensive 
results is itself an important issue of justice.77g8 
In arguing his case to the Supreme Court, Chambers at- 
tempted to classify the various inherent powers,gg relying on 
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc.loO In Eash, the Third Circuit 
undertook an extensive survey of inherent powers from the 
major federal cases and attempted a rational categorization of 
those  power^.'^' The Supreme Court rejected Chambers's 
overture, noting that "this Court has never so classified the in- 
herent powers, and we have no need to do so now."lo2 
The Court was perhaps correct in its assessment that de- 
termination of the Chambers case did not demand adoption of 
the Eash classifications. Nor should Eash's conclusions neces- 
sarily be adopted wholesale by the Supreme Court, despite the 
Third Circuit's persuasive and somewhat thorough treatment of 
the subject. The Supreme Court's rejection of a rational classifi- 
cation of inherent powers, however, highlights one of the most 
troubling aspects of Chambers and other Supreme Court deci- 
sions in this area: the indiscriminate use of inherent powers 
precedents. 
Eash is helpful at this point because it condenses persua- 
sive commentary on the inherent powers, identifying three 
recurring criticisms of the inherent powers cases: (1) the lack of 
guidance from the cases, (2) the use of the term "inherent pow- 
er" to describe distinguishable powers, and (3) the reliance on 
cases involving one inherent power to  support the use of anoth- 
er. Chambers is replete with examples of each. 
1. Lack of guidance from the cases 
"[Plerhaps because federal courts infrequently resort to 
98. Cogan, supra note 65, at 1011. 
99. See 111 S. Ct. at 2134 11.12. 
100. 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
101. See id. at 561-64 (distinguishing between inherent powers beyond the reach 
of Congress, those subject to congressional modification but not defeasance, and 
those subject to complete congressional override). 
102. 111 S. Ct. at 2134 11.12. 
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their inherent power or because such reliance most often is not 
challenged, very few federal cases discuss in detail the topic of 
inherent powers."103 This is especially true of Supreme Court 
cases, of which only a handful exist. lM 
The Court has not been without its opportunities, however. 
In Guardian Trust Co. u. Kansas City Southern Railway,lo5 
for example, the Eighth Circuit traced the history of the inher- 
ent power t o  shift fees for bad-faith litigation, detailing the 
development of the power in the English courts and its subse- 
quent recognition in the federal courts. On review, the Su- 
preme Court assumed the existence of the power for 
argument's sake, but "express[ed] no opinion" as to its exis- 
tence in reversing on other grounds.lo6 
The Supreme Court cases that do touch on inherent powers 
offer little more than magic phrases; they are lacking in sub- 
stance. The Chambers dissent laments the fact that no stan- 
dards exist for finding bad faith or for assuring due pro- 
cess,lo7 and with good reason: the Court barely mentions 
these "standards" in passing.lo8 Concrete standards are cru- 
cial in this nebulous area of the law, however, because so much 
is at stake, as evidenced by the million-dollar fee shift in 
Chambers. log 
Perhaps the reason prior cases provide such little guidance 
is because none actually held a party liable under the bad-faith 
exception. Alyeska recognized exceptions to the American Rule 
in dicta, but noted that hone of the exceptions is involved 
here."'1° F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial La- 
103. Eash, 757 F.2d a t  561. 
104. See supra part 1I.D. 
105. 28 F.2d 233, 241-46 (8th Cir. 1928), reu'd on other grounds, 281 US. 1 
(1930). 
106. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Guardian Trust Co., 281 US. 1, 10 (1930). 
107. 111 S. Ct. at  2145 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
108. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2136 (1991) ("A court 
must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power, and it must com- 
ply with the mandates of due process, both in determining that the requisite bad 
faith exists and in assessing fees . . . ."); cf. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 
U.S. 752, 767 (1980) ("[Tlhe trial court did not make a specific finding as to 
whether counsel's conduct in this case constituted bad faith, a finding that would 
have to precede any sanction under the court's inherent powers."); id. ("[Alttorney's 
fees certainly should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportu- 
nity for a hearing on the record."). 
109. See supm text accompanying notes 46-47; cf. Cogan, supra note 65, at  1021 
("The imposition of a sanction often is a serious deprivation of property and liber- 
ty."). 
110. Alyeska Pipeline Sew. Co. v. Wilderness Soc7y, 421 US. 240, 259 (1975). 
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bor Co.,l1' the case Alyeska relied on to enunciate the bad- 
faith exception, also stated the rule in dicta, relying on a feder- 
al admiralty case"' and several circuit court cases.113 Road- 
way Express remanded for a determination of the inherent 
powers issue.ll4 It is no wonder, then, that the Chambers 
Court had little more to work with than a worn-out phrase, 
passed from case to case, with no substance: fees can be shifted 
when a party has acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or 
for oppressive reasons."l15 
In fact, Chambers is the first Supreme Court case to 
squarely address the inherent power of a court to  assess fees 
against a party for bad-faith litigation.ll6 Despite its ultimate 
lack of guidance, "[tlhe Chambers decision represents the most 
elaborate treatment to date of the inherent power concept.""' 
Given the opportunity again, the Court should concentrate on 
enunciating concrete standards to  guide the lower courts, attor- 
neys, and litigants. lls 
2. Use of the term "inherent power" to describe distinguishable 
powers 
"[Tlhose cases that have employed inherent power appear 
to  use that generic term to describe several distinguishable 
court  power^.""^ The Chambers opinion is guilty of this 
transgression as well. In fact, the Court pits the textual sane- 
111. 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974). 
112. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962) (allowing attorney's fees as part 
of the damages remedy). But see 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 92, at  54-506 ("The 
[bad-faith] exception is an exception to the general rule on costs, not a theory of 
damages."). 
113. See417U.S. at 1298cn.17. 
114. See 447 U.S. at 767. 
115. 111 S. Ct. at 2133. 
116. The assertion of the Court in F.D. Rich Co. that "[wle have long recognized 
that attorneys' fees may be awarded to a successful party when his opponent has 
acted in bad faith," 417 U.S. at  129 (dictum), is an exaggeration at best. 
117. Coyle, supra note 81, at  31 (summarizing remarks of Professor Carl Tobias). 
118. "By its silence, the Supreme Court has left to the lower courts the develop- 
ment of a standard for finding bad faith." Michael C. Lamb, Comment, Awards of 
Attorneys' Fees Against Attorneys: Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
950, 968 (1980). The same can be said of other important criteria. Numerous 
courts and commentators, however, have thoughtfully suggested appropriate stan- 
dards to be applied in these cases. See, e.g., 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 92, a t  
54-501 to 54-503 (and cases cited therein); Judith L. Maute, Sporting Theory of 
Justice: Taming Adversary Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. 
REV. 7, 25 (1987); Lamb, supra, at  968. 
119. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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tioning powers not against any particular inherent power, but 
against "the inherent power."'20 It is not surprising that the 
Court found no legislative intent to  displace a power so de- 
scribed.12' 
As already noted, the inherent power to shift fees as part 
of costs is not necessarily the same as the inherent power to 
impose sanctions,'22 yet the two become blurred when re- 
ferred to merely as "the inherent power." Discussion of various 
other inherent powers only confuses the issue further. 
The Court has no excuse for this hodgepodge. Numerous 
commentators have analyzed the cases and defined the pow- 
ers? Even individual powers have been examined and sub- 
divided? In short, the Court has no legitimate reason to 
lump distinguishable powers together. 
3. Reliance on cases involving one inherent power to support 
the use of another 
"To compound this lack of specificity, courts have relied 
occasionally on precedents involving one form of power to sup- 
port the court's use of another."'* The Chambers Court 
began its discussion of the exceptions to the American Rule by 
noting that "in narrowly defined circumstances federal courts 
have inherent power to assess attorney's fees against 
counsel .' This was not the issue in Chambers, but the 
Court nevertheless proceeded on the assumption that attorney 
sanctions cases-namely Roadway Express--controlled imposi- 
tion of sanctions on litigants. 
120. 111S.Ct.at2131-32. 
121. Cf. A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judi- 
cial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33 
(1958) ("[Wlhenever courts have felt themselves too tightly pressed by legislative 
regulation they have found in the doctrine of judicial independence a large reser- 
voir of integral supremacy."). 
122. See supra part IV.A.1. 
123. See, e.g., 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 92, a t  54-493 to 54-509; 10 WRIGHT 
ET AL., supra note 15, 5 2675, at  257-310; Mallor, supra note 11; Maute, supra 
note 118; Tyrell Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Meeting Pro- 
cedure, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 459 (1937); Chipser, supra note 11. 
124. See, e.g., Mallor, supra note 11, at 630-52 (distinguishing between bad-faith 
exception cases based on prelitigation misconduct, substantive bad faith, procedural 
bad faith, and attorneys' personal liability); cf 6 MOORE ET AL., supra note 92, a t  
54-499 to 54-509 (discussing and distinguishing the bad faith exception cases). 
125. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 1985). 
126. 111 S. Ct. at  2133 (quoting Roadway Express, 447 US. 752, 765 (1980)) 
(emphasis added). 
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This loose use of precedent is nothing new in inherent 
powers cases. "[Tlhe Court itself was confused in Roadway 
Express, relying on cases such as . . . Alyeska Pipeline Service v. 
Wilderness Society, [a] case[] involving judicial power indisput- 
ably subject to congressional override, for the content of a judi- 
cial power 'shielded from direct democratic controls.' "I2' 
One example from Chambers illustrates the consequences 
of this approach. The Court cites Link v. Wabash Railroad 
Co.12' for the proposition that outright dismissal of a lawsuit 
is severe, yet within a court's d is~ret ion. '~~ "Consequently, 
the 'less severe sanction' of an  assessment of attorney's fees is 
undoubtedly within a court's inherent power as well."lsO Ana- 
lytically, one might tend to agree with this statement.13' Yet 
as  applied to the facts of this case, the comparison makes no 
sense. Had Chambers merely been dismissed out of court, he 
would have been in far better shape than he was after he lost 
on the merits and was assessed one million dollars in 
attorney's fees. Reliance on an inherent dismissal power to 
support an inherent fee shifting power causes the precedent to 
lose much of its force and leaves one wondering whether it  was 
really "precedential" a t  all. 
Before Chambers the Supreme Court had never approved 
a n  inherent power to shift fees as  a sanction for bad-faith con- 
duct apart from the inherent power to award fees as part of the 
costs to the prevailing party.ls2 Why, then, did the Court hold 
as  it did in Chambers? Unquestionably, the Court is concerned 
about conduct by parties such as Chambers in the federal 
courts. All the Justices agreed that  Chambers should have been 
sanctioned;ls3 they merely disagreed about the proper judicial 
127. Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Feakral 
Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 
1005 (1983) (footnotes omitted). 
128. 370 U.S. 626 (1962); see supra text accompanying notes 29-31. 
129. 111 S. Ct. at 2133. 
130. Id. (quoting Roadway Express, 447 U.S. a t  765). 
131. But see Cogan, supm note 65, a t  1016 ("Tens of thousands of dollars [in 
sandions] in many cases overwhelms the amount at  stake in a plaintiffs case and 
becomes in effect a dismissal. Moreover, the mere possibility of such an award is 
so onerous for some plaintiffs that it becomes the potential case's death-knell just 
as  assuredly as is dismissal of a filed case."). 
132. Some circuit court decisions had, however, recognized such a power. See 
cases cited supra note 90. 
133. See 111 S. Ct. at  2136 (deeming all of Chambers's conduct sandionable); id. 
at  2141 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the court had power to sanction con- 
duct under both the Rules and the inherent power); id. at 2149 ( K e ~ e d y ,  J., dis- 
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procedure. The outcome of the case indicates that a majority of 
the Court views curbing litigation misconduct as the overriding 
policy in this context, superior to other vitally important inter- 
ests inv01ved.l~~ Holding otherwise would only further mire 
the courts in addressing mischief as it occurs.135 
After Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., federal district courts may 
shift attorney's fees as sanctions for bad-faith conduct in litiga- 
tion. This is a substantial power, of which all involved-judges, 
attorneys, and litigants-ought to be aware. 
The Supreme Court fashioned the new power out of inher- 
ent powers precedents, but went beyond traditional equitable 
powers thought to be inherent in the courts. In  fact, the Court's 
use of its precedents is a concern in all of the inherent powers 
cases, as illustrated by Chambers. The Court needs to address 
and rectify this problem to provide clear guidance to federal 
court litigants and lawyers. 
In the meantime, it is clear the Supreme Court has 
stepped up the war against litigation misconduct. Chambers 
provides the ammunition. Those who fail to heed the warning 
may ultimately pay dearly. 
Step hen K. Christiansen 
senting) (There is "no question but that some sandionable a d s  did occur in 
court."). 
134. Cf. NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 142 
(W.D. La. 1989) ("Courts should not hesitate to address and sandion similar trans- 
gressions in whatever the judicial theater they may occur."); SANCTIONS, supra note 
5, a t  22 ("[Wlhere the conduct is sufficiently willful, obstructive or contumacious, i t  
will be sanctioned, whether a specific rule exists or not."). 
135. "Rules require sanctions. Sanctions require enforcement proceedings. These 
absorb resources of time, energy and money that is the very purpose of the rules 
to  spare." Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. 
REV. 243, 244 (1984). 
